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BATASUNA BANNED: THE DISSOLUTION 
OF POLITICAL PARTIES UNDER THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
THOMAS AYRES* 
Abstract: This Note reviews the history of Basque terrorism in Spain and 
the Spanish's government's recent decision to ban Batasuna, the political 
party affiliated with the militant group, ETA. Although Article 11 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fund-
amental Freedoms affords Spanish citizens the freedom of association, it 
recognizes Spain's need to protect its citizens from terrorist violence. This 
Note argues that the European Court of Human Rights, based on rel-
evant case law, will most likely find that Batasuna's dissolution does not 
violate Article 11 because it is necessary and proportional to the end of 
protecting Spain's democratic system. 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the international 
community has focused its collective attention on measures to mini-
mize the threat of future acts of terror.' Spain, which has suffered 
separatist violence since its transition to democracy, has been no ex-
ception.2 In its efforts to eliminate the dangers posed by the Basque 
militant group, ETA,3 the Spanish government has recently moved to 
outlaw the separatist party, Batasuna, which has long been considered 
* Thomas Ayres is the Senior Managing Editor of the Boston College Intemational & 
Comparative Law Review. 
' See For Whom the Liberty Bell Tolls-Civil Liberties Since September 11th. THE EcoNOMIST, 
Aug. 31, 2002, at 5 [hereinafter Civil Liberties]. 
2 Tim Golden, Buoyed by World's Focus on Terror, Spain Cracks Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 
2002, at AS. 
3 ETA is the Basque acronym for "Basque Homeland and Liberty." !d. The group's aim 
is the full independence of four northern Spanish provinces, three of them entirely 
Basque (Alava, Guipuzcua, and Vizcaya) and one only partially Basque (Navarra). ANTo-
NIO VERCHER, TERRORISM IN EUROPE 168 (1992). 
99 
100 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:99 
the terrorist group's political wing. 4 While Batasuna is now pursuing 
judicial appeals in the Spanish courts, its case will most likely end up 
in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).5 Based on recent 
case law, the ECHR will most likely find that the Spanish govern-
ment's dissolution of Batasuna is not a violation of its freedom of as-
sociation under Article 11 of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention).6 
Part I of this Note presents a brief account of the political history 
of the Basque region in the post-Franco era and a review of the Spanish 
government's recent actions against Batasuna. Part II discusses Article 
11 of the Convention and the ECHR's approach to the dissolution of 
political parties in recent cases. Part III concludes that the ECHR will 
most likely find that Batasuna's dissolution does not violate Article 11. 
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. Basque Nationalism in Post-Franco Spain 
Since democracy returned to Spain after General Francisco 
Franco's death in 1975, the Spanish government has generally fol-
lowed a policy of accommodation with respect to the Basque national-
ists. 7 As a result, the autonomous region has amassed many powers of 
self-government, including control of police force, schools, and social 
welfare, with Spain ceding ample tax revenues.8 Nevertheless, auton-
omy policies have failed to stop separatist violence.9 As the most active 
militant group in Western Europe, ETA has been linked to over 800 
deaths since 1968.10 President jose Maria Aznar, who survived an ETA 
assassination attempt in 1995 shortly after taking office, has taken a 
hard line against violence and made only cursory attempts at negotia-
4 Civil Liberties, supra note 1. Batasuna has changed its name in the past few years from 
"Herri Batasuna" to "Euskal Herritarrok" and then to "Batasuna" to avoid bans. Emma 
Daly, judge Bans Basque Party, Linking It to Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at A4. 
5 Basque Party to Fight Ban, BBC NEws, Aug. 28, 2002, at http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
low I europe/2220931.stm. 
6 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 11, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,232 [hereinafter Convention]. The Conven-
tion, as well as cases and materials of the ECHR and now-defunct European Commission 
on Human Rights (Commission), are available at http:/ /www.echr.coe.int. 
7 Golden, supra note 2. 
8 /d.; see VICTOR PEREZ-DIAZ, SPAIN AT THE CROSSROADS 159 (1999). 
9 Golden, supra note 2. 
10 Id. ETA's victims have been primarily political opponents and members of the 
armed forces and police. See id. 
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tion.ll Despite conciliatory efforts on both sides, however, murders 
and bombings persist.I2 
The Spanish government considers Batasuna an integral part of 
the terrorist problem because the party does not condemn ETA's ac-
tions and simultaneously denies any complicity.13 In addition, Spain 
contends that some individuals have concurrent membership in both 
ETA and Batasuna.14 In spite of the party's limited popular support in 
the region,15 Batasuna frequently makes a common cause with the 
moderate Basque nationalists, who control the regional parliament, 
thereby making it difficult for Spain to isolate the radicals who con-
done violence.l6 
B. Spain's Dissolution of Batasuna 
President Aznar took advantage of the focus on terrorism follow-
ing the events of September 11th by equating Basque radicals with 
Islamic fundamentalists and pressing European government to do 
more to fight terrorism in SpainP The European Union responded 
to his requests by officially listing ETA and Batasuna as terrorist or-
ganizations in December 2001 and june 2003, respectively.18 
In addition to its international efforts, Spain took steps within its 
own borders when, in June 2002, its Parliament amended its Law of 
Political Parties to address organizations associated with terrorism.l9 
The revised Article 9 establishes that a party will be declared illegal 
when its "grave and continuous" activity "makes democratic principles 
11 Id. 
12 ld. ETA unilaterally declared a truce in September 1998, which it broke fifteen 
months later. PEREZ-DIAZ, supra note 8, at 170-72; Golden, supra note 2. 
13 See Batasuna Banned, THE EcoNOMIST, Aug. 31, 2002, at 13. 
14 Daniel Trotta, Spain Formally Asks Court to Ban Basque Pmty, REUTERS, Sept. 3, 2002. 
In August 2002, the Spanish Justice Minister presented 23 charges-displayed in 26 boxes 
containing 1000 pieces of evidence-linking Batasuna with ETA and singling out 194 of 
the party's political leaders who belong to ETA. !d. 
15 Id. Batasuna received only 10% of popular vote in 2001 regional elections (its worst 
showing ever), down from 18% in 1998. Id.; see Batasuna Banned, supra note 13. 
16 Golden, supra note 2. 
17 Id. 
18 Council Regulation 2580/01 of 28 December 2001 on Specific RestrictiYe Measures 
Directed Against Persons and Entities with a View to Combating Terrorism, art. 2(3), 2001 
OJ. (L 344) 2, available at http:/ I europa.eu.int; Justice and Home Affairs: EU Approves List of 
Terrorist Groups, EvR. REP.,Jan. 5, 2002; EU Blacklists Basque Party, BBC NEws,June 5, 2003, 
at http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/2965260.stm. 
19 Ley Organica de Partidos Politicos [Organic Law of Political Parties], (L.O.P.P. 
2002, 12756), art. 9 (Spain), http://www. elpais.es [hereinafter Law of Political Parties). 
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vulnerable."20 Moreover, Article 9 provides that such actions by par-
liamentary or municipal party members can only give rise to illegaliza-
tion through "repetition or accumulation. "21 
Following an August 2002 vote, the Spanish Parliament asked the 
Supreme Court (Spain's second highest tribunal) to dissolve Batasuna 
pursuant to the amended law.22 In March 2002, the Supreme Court's 
sixteen member panel unanimously approved the government's re-
quest for a permanent ban.23 Batasuna appealed the Supreme Court's 
decision to the Constitutional Court (Spain's highest tribunal), which 
unanimously upheld the ban, citing the group's "ideologies associated 
with terrorism and violence."24 
C. Appeal to the ECHR 
Batasuna has indicated that it will appeal the Constitutional 
Court's decision to the ECHR, alleging a violation of its freedom of 
association under Article 11 of the Convention.25 The ECHR has be-
come the final court of appeal for citizens of most Western European 
nations and the Convention their "bill of rights."26 Spain, which has 
ratified the Convention, has formally accepted the ECHR jurisdiction 
2o !d. art. 9(2). Prohibited activities include: 
promoting, justifying or excusing assaults against the life or the integrity of 
persons ... inciting, bringing about or legitimizing violence as a means for 
the achievement of political objectives ... politically complementing and 
helping the action of terrorist organizations for the achievement of their ends 
of subverting constitutional order or gravely altering public peace ... giving 
express or tacit political support, legitimizing terrorist actions or excusing 
and minimizing their significance. 
!d. art. 9(2) (a)-( c), (3) (a). 
21 Id. art. 9(3). 
22 Law of Political Parties, supra note 19, art. 11 (1) (government must petition special 
session of Supreme Court); id. art. 10(5) (dissolution of political party reserved for special 
session of Supreme Court); Trotta, supra note 14. 
23 Law of Political Parties, supra note 19, art. 11 (7); Batasuna Banned Pennanently, BBC 
NEWS, Mar. 17, 2003, at http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2857437.stm. On the 
same day as the parliamentary vote, Public Prosecutor Baltasar Garzon announced a three-
year suspension of Batasuna, which immediately banned public rallies and demonstrations, 
closed offices, excluded party representatives from the following year's elections, seized 
assets, and froze bank accounts (approximately $23 million). Daly, supra note 4. 
24 Constitutional Court Affinns tltat Batasuna Defmds 'Ideologies Associated witlt Ter-rorism,' 
EL PAIS, Jan. 20, 2004, http:/ /www.elpais.es. 
25 Spain Maintains Basque Party Ban, BBC NEWS, Jan. 26, 2004, at http:/ /news.bbc. 
co.uk/1/hi/world/ europe/3405211.stm. 
26 VERCHER, supm note 3, at 342-43; Tlte Power of Shame, THE EcoNOMIST, Dec. 5, 1998, 
at 5. 
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and the right of individuals to appeal to it once all appeals in their 
domestic courts are exhausted.27 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Article 11 of the Convention 
Article 11 ( 1) specifically addresses the dual freedoms of assembly 
and association: "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful as-
sembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right 
to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests."28 
The freedom of association allows individuals to "come together for 
the protection of their interests by forming a collective entity which 
represents them."29 Where those interests are political, "the function 
of Article 11 is central to the effective working of a democratic sys-
tem" because associations serve to collect and spread ideas through-
out society.30 
Although an association enjoys fundamental rights against the 
state, Article 11 (2) allows the state to impose some restraints: 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights 
other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime ... or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.31 
Thus, state interference with Article 11 (1) rights to freedom of asso-
ciation must find its justification under Article 11 (2) .32 
B. The ECHR's Approach to Alleged ATticle 11 Violations 
When confronted with an alleged violation of Article 11, the 
ECHR employs a two-tiered approach.33 It first considers whether the 
27 Convention, supm note 6, arts. 32, 35. Spain ratified the Comention on Oct. 4, 1979. 
Dates of Ratifications, at http:/ /www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/DatesOfRatifications.html 
(n.d.). 
28 Convention, mpm note 6, art. 11 (1). 
29 DJ. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 421 
(1995). 
30 ld. at 417. 
31 Convention, supra note 6, art. 11 (2). 
32 HARRIS, supra note 29, at 424. 
33 United Communist Party v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 146 
(1998) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
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state interfered with the petitioner's freedom of association.34 If the 
answer to that question is yes, the ECHR then inquires as to whether 
that interference was justified under Article 11 (2).35 
The initial question of interference is a relatively obvious one for 
the ECHR to answer because a political party is protected under Arti-
cle 11 (1) and its dissolution necessarily impinges on its members' 
right to associate for the furtherance of their economic, social, or cul-
tural interests.36 Despite the express reference to trade unions in Arti-
cle 11 ( 1), the ECHR has long read the provision broadly to include 
political parties.37 To ensure that the association right is "practical and 
effective," the Convention guarantees that a political party has the 
right to freely carry out activities after its formation.38 
Moving to the multifaceted issue ofwhether the interference was 
justified, a state must show that its action (1) is prescribed by law, (2) 
has a legitimate aim, and (3) is necessary in a democratic society.39 
With respect to the first requirement, the ECHR has held that a state 
must make two showings: ( 1) that the law in question is "adequately 
accessible"; and (2) that the norm is "formulated with sufficient preci-
sion to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. "40 Thus, the ECHR 
requires the persons concerned to have been aware of the scope of 
the law's application and reasonably foresee the consequences of 
their actions.4I 
The ECHR then tests the government's motivations for imposing 
the interference by inquiring whether the government pursued at 
least one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 11 (2).42 The ECHR 
will thus consider ensuring national security, public safety, and territo-
rial integrity, preventing disorder and crime, and protecting the rights 
and freedoms of others as legitimate governmental goals.43 
34 /d. 
35 /d. 
36 HARRIS, supra note 29, at 417, 421. 
37 United Communist Party, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 132 (citing German Communist Party v. 
Germany, App. No. 250/57, 1957Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 222 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)). 
38 United Communist Party, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 145. 
39 /d. at 146-47; see Convention, supra note 6, art. 11 (2). 
40 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 271 (1980) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
41 Purcell v. Ireland, App. No. 15404/89, 1991 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 90, 99 (Eur. 
Comm'n on H.R). 
42 United Communist Party, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 146; see Convention, supra note 6, art. 
11(2). 
43 United Communist Party, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 146. 
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The final and most difficult issue for the ECHR's consideration is 
that of the necessity of the interference in a democratic society.44 The 
ECHR has stated that "notwithstanding its autonomous role and par-
ticular sphere of application, Article 11 must ... be considered in 
light of Article 10," which guarantees freedom of expression.45 The 
ECHR justifies the merger of these two articles on the grounds that 
protecting opinions and the freedom to express them is one of the 
objectives of the freedom of association.46 The state, as the ultimate 
guarantor of pluralism, has an obligation to hold free elections under 
conditions that will ensure the free expression of opinions vis-a-vis the 
voters' choice of the legislature.47 The expression of Yoter preference 
would be "inconceivable without the participation of a plurality of po-
litical parties representing the different shades of opinion to be found 
within a country's population."48 Thus, political parties make an "ir-
replaceable contribution to political debate. "49 
The adjective "necessary" does not mean "indispensable" or 
merely "reasonable"; instead, it "implies the existence of a 'pressing so-
cial need."'5° Consequently, the ECHR strictly construes the exceptions 
set out in Article 11 (2) and will only accept "compelling and convinc-
ing" reasons to justifY restrictions on political parties' freedom of asso-
ciation. 51 The ECHR does not substitute its own view for that of the na-
tional authorities; rather, it looks at the interference in light of the case 
as a whole in order to determine whether it corresponds to "a pressing 
social need," is "proportionate to the legitimate aimed pursued," and 
whether the state's justifications are "relevant and sufficient."52 In order 
to find in favor of the state, the ECHR must "satisfy itself that the na-
tional authorities applied standards which were in conformity with 
44 Seeid. at 147. 
45 Id. Article 10(1) provides that the right to freedom of expression "shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers" Convention, supra note 6, art. 10( 1). 
46 United Communist Party, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 14 7 (citing Young, James & Webster v. 
United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38, 55 (1982); Vogt v. Germany, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 205, 
240. (1996)). 
47 United Communist PaTty, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 147-48. 
48 Id. 
49 ld. 
50 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 275 (1980) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) 
(citing Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 754 (1979) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) ). 
51 United Communist Party, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 149. 
52 Id. 
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principles embodied in Article 11 ... and that they based their deci-
sions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts."53 
In keeping with its supervisory role, the ECHR affords a "margin 
of appreciation" to the national authorities, which slightly mitigates 
this otherwise strict test. 54 The scope of this deference is narrow 
where the nature of legitimate aim finds significant common ground 
among the laws of the contracting states because national authorities 
are not necessarily in a more informed position than the ECHR.55 In 
the context of dissolution of a political party, the indispensability of 
pluralism in a democracy further justifies the narrow margin of ap-
preciation left to states.56 
C. Recent ECHR Decisions Involving the Dissolution of Political Parties 
The ECHR has strictly construed exceptions to Article 11 with 
respect to political parties mostly because of their fundamental role in 
democracy. 57 The ECHR has thus viewed party dissolution as a "drastic 
measure" to be applied "only in the most serious cases."58 The ECHR 
has held that a political party may campaign for a change in law pro-
vided the means used to that end are legal and the change proposed 
is compatible with democratic principles.59 However, if in trying to 
change the law a party's leaders incite recourse to violence or propose 
a policy that either: ( 1) does not comply with the rules of democracy, 
(2) aims to destroy democratic order, or (3) seeks to infringe upon 
the freedoms of others, the party then "cannot lay claim to the pro-
tection of the Convention. "60 
In United Communist PaTty v. Turkey, the ECHR unanimously held 
that the Turkish government violated Article 11 by dissolving the 
United Communist Party, whose name and references to Kurdish 
53 Id. 
54 Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1, 48 
(1995). 
55 Sunday Times, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 276. But see X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
3898/68, 1970 YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 666, 684 (allowing considerable measure of discre-
tion to domestic authorities where aim is prevention of disorder and crime). 
56 Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340, 42-44/98, 35 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 3, 91 (2002) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
57 Id. 
5s I d. 
59 Id. at 78-79. 
60 Id. 
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"people" and "nation" in its program violated Turkish law.61 The 
ECHR ruled that there was no justification for hindering a political 
group simply because it sought to debate a controversial issue and 
take part in national politicallife.62 The ECHR acknowledged that the 
party's program may have concealed objectives different from the 
ones it proclaimed; however, since the party was dissolved shortly after 
its formation, it had no opportunity to take any action.63 The ECHR 
concluded that, absent any activity by the United Communist Party, it 
could not consider the party a terrorist organization.64 
Conversely, in a four to three vote, the ECHR held in Welfare Party 
v. Turkey that Turkey did not violate Article 11 by dissolving a political 
party that advocated a multijudicial system-with Islamic law applying 
exclusively to the Muslim community-and whose members made ref-
erence to a jihad as a political means.65 The ECHR found that a multi-
judicial system would create discrimination between individuals based 
on religion, which is inconsistent with democratic principles under the 
Convention.66 Moreover, the fact that Welfare Party leaders neither 
clarified nor contradicted reports that some party members might re-
sort to force posed a considerable risk to public order.67 Turkey's Con-
stitutional Court dissolved the Welfare Party and then temporarily de-
prived the five offending members of their parliamentary offices; the 
remaining 152 party members-a third of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly68-continued in their seats and were able to pursue their po-
litical careers.69 The ECHR held that this interference was not "dispro-
portionate to the legitimate aims pursued" relative to the "pressing so-
61 United Communist Party v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 125-
27 (1998) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
62 /d. at 154. 
63 /d. 
64 /d. 
65 Welfare Party, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91. In its primary meaning, jihad is defined as "a 
holy war and the battle which has to be fought until the total domination of society by the 
Muslim religion is achieved." /d. at 88. 
66 /d. at 85-86; see Convention, supra note 6, art. 14 (prohibiting discrimination). 
67 Welfare Party, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 88-89. The dissenters felt that there was no "com-
pelling or convincing evidence ... that the party ... took any steps to reali[z]e political 
aims, ... to destroy or undermine secular society, to engage in or encourage acts of vio-
lence or religious hatred, or otherwise to pose a threat to legal and democratic order." /d. 
at 105. 
68 /d. at 89. 
69 /d. at 91. 
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cial need" that it answered.70 Moreover, the reasons adduced to justify 
the dissolution of the party were "relevant and sufficient. "71 
Most recently, in People's Labour Party v. Turkey, the ECHR unani-
mously held that the principles for which the party stood, such as self-
determination and recognition of language rights, were not contrary 
to the fundamental principles of democracy.72 The ECHR reasoned 
that if advocating such principles constituted supporting terrorism, 
the possibility of dealing with related questions within the framework 
of democratic debate would be diminished.73 Armed movements 
would then monopolize popular support for the party's principles, 
which would be at odds with the democratic ideals of Article 11.74 Al-
though the People's Labour Party severely criticized certain actions of 
the Turkish armed forces in its antiterrorist campaign, such com-
ments did not constitute evidence that the party was equated with the 
terrorist groups.71; Given the wide limits of permissible criticism of 
government,76 the ECHR held that the party's condemnation of the 
Turkish armed forces was merely drawing attention to its constituents' 
concerns.77 Because the People's Labour Party had not advocated any 
policy that could have undermined the democratic regime and had 
not urged or sought to justify recourse to force for political ends, its 
dissolution could not reasonably be considered to correspond to a 
"pressing social need. "78 
III. ANALYSIS 
Should Batasuna's case reach the ECHR, the party's dissolution 
will be subjected to the two-tiered test applied in the previous cases. 79 
The ECHR will almost certainly find that Spain interfered with Bata-
suna's freedom of association.80 Moreover, it will probably find that 
70 /d. 
71 Welfare Party, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91. 
72 Yazar, Karatas, Askoy & People's Labour Party v. Turkey, App. Nos. 22723-25/93, 36 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 6, 76 (2003) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
73 /d. 
74 /d. 
75 /d. at 75. 
76 Castells v. Spain, App. No. 11798/85, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 445, 477 (1992) (Eur. Ct. 
H.R.) (upholding Basque parliament member's published criticism of Spain's antiterrorist 
campaign). 
77 People's Labour Party, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 77. 
7s Id. 
79 See United Communist Party v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 
146 (1998)(Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
80 See id. 
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such interference was prescribed by law and pursuant to a legitimate 
aim, leaving the ECHR to address the most difficult question of 
whether Spain's dissolution of Batasuna is "necessary in a democratic 
society. "81 In other words, does the ban correspond to a "pressing so-
cial need," is it "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued," and are 
Spain's justifications "relevant and sufficient"?82 
Spain will likely offer as evidence public acts by Batasuna officials 
during the summer of 2002 that it believes demonstrate the party's 
endorsement-both tacit and active-of violence as a means for politi-
cal ends.83 For example: elected Batasuna officials did not condemn 
fatal bombings and refused to participate in efforts to help the bomb-
ing victims and their families; a spokesperson reportedly stated that 
the party "does not wish that ETA stops killing"; another spokesperson 
claimed that the amended Law of Political Parties expressly justifies 
and legitimizes terrorist action for the achievement of political ends; 
the same spokesperson held President Aznar responsible for past and 
future acts of violence and suggested that terrorist acts would cease if 
the efforts to ban Batasuna ended; Batasuna officials publicly praised 
imprisoned terrorists, calling them "political prisoners," and led pub-
lic homages to dead militants; and ETA militants with criminal rec-
ords have formed part of Batasuna's directive organs, electoral lists, 
and municipal and parliamentary groups.B4 
Convention case law indicates that political speech supporting ter-
rorism does not merit protection under the Convention; therefore, the 
ECHR will most likely find that Spain was responding to a "pressing so-
cial need" when it banned Batasuna due to its officials' statements ac-
tively supporting violence and their concurrent membership with 
ETA.85 In Purcell v. Ireland, the European Commission of Human Rights 
upheld restrictions placed upon the broadcast of live interviews with 
members of Sinn Fein-which is considered the Irish Republican 
Army's political wing-in part because "the defeat of terrorism is a pub-
lic interest of the first importance."86 For the Commission, denying po-
81 Seeid. at 146-49. 
82 ld. 
83 See generally Sentence of the Supreme Court Banning Batasuna, EL PAIS, http://www. el-
pais.es (n.d.) (cataloguing Batasuna's alleged violations of the Law of Political Parties). 
84 ld. 
85 See Anthony Lester, Freedom of Expression, in THE EuROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PRo-
TECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 473 (R.StJ. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993). 
86 Purcell, 1991 YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 101. Before 1999, the Commission deter-
mined the preliminary question of admissibility and drew up a report for the ECHR estab-
lishing the facts and expressing an opinion on the merits of the case; the Commission was 
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litical supporters of terrorist organizations the use of broadcast media 
as "a platform for advocating their cause, encouraging support ... , and 
conveying the impression of legitimacy" was "necessary in a democratic 
society. "87 The ECHR will most likely consider Spain's dissolution of 
Batasuna as corresponding to a "pressing social need" due to the im-
portance placed on the defeat of terrorism.88 
The ECHR will also probably consider Batasuna officials' public 
statements and concurrent membership with ETA as "relevant and 
sufficient" evidence of the party's active support of violence to achieve 
political ends, thereby justifying Spain's interference.89 In response, 
Batasuna may argue that its official program identifies it as a demo-
cratic association dedicated to dialogue and negotiation.90 However, 
this fact is not dispositive because the ECHR will compare the program 
with the actions of the party in an effort to expose hidden objectives.91 
Spain's proof of Batasuna's actions in the context of Basque separatist 
violence is similar to evidence that the Commission deemed sufficient 
to justify the ban on Sinn Fein's statements in Pun:ell.92 Moreover, just as 
the Welfare Party failed to clarify its members' jihad statements, Bata-
suna has not publicly distanced itself from, nor offered benign inter-
pretations of, its officials' statements and actions supporting political 
violence.93 Finally, concurrent membership of a substantial number of 
persons in both Batasuna and ETA is overwhelming evidence that 
equates them as associations seeking to undermine democracy by 
achieving political ends through violent means.94 
While speech actively supporting terrorism is not protected, the 
Convention does not compel political actors to condemn violence.95 
Therefore, the ECHR will most likely not uphold Spain's prohibition 
subsequently collapsed into the ECHR. Convention, supra note 6, Protocol No. 11 (en-
tered into force Nov. 1, 1998). 
87 Purcell, 1991 YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 102. 
88 See id. 
89 See Welfare Party v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340, 42-44/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 91 
(2002) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
90 See Basic Principles for Democracy in the Basque Country (2.1), Ideological Bases, at 
http:/ /www.batasuna.org/batasuna/g_index.htm (last modified June 23, 2001). 
91 See United Communist Party v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 
154 (1998)(Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
92 See generally Purcell, 1991 YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 90. 
93 See Welfare Party, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 88-89. 
94 See Purcell, 1991 YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 100. 
95 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17488/90, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 146 
(1996) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (compelling journalist to reveal source is a breach of negative 
right). 
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of "tacit" support of ETA on the grounds that it constitutes protected 
negative speech.96 Moreover, even though silence in this context 
might have some political significance, it does not suffice as "compel-
ling and convincing" evidence that Batasuna supports terrorism.97 
Batasuna's situation is not like that of the United Communist Party 
or the People's Labour Party because Batasuna officials are not merely 
seeking to debate a controversial political matter or criticizing govern-
mental action.98 Instead, by advocating violence or, at the very least, not 
excluding the possibility of violent means to achieve political goals, 
Batasuna is not complying with the democratic ideal underlying the 
Convention.99 Like the Welfare Party members' support of a jihad and 
Sinn Fein's advocacy of terrorism, Batasuna's statements cause a sub-
stantial risk to public order.l00 While Batasuna does not have nearly the 
same power or influence as the Welfare Party when it was dissolved, the 
dangers to public order are nevertheless "tangible" and "immediate" 
due to the long history of separatist violence in Spain.101 
Because dissolution must be proportional to the aim pursued, 
the ECHR will accept such a drastic measure in only the most serious 
cases of a "pressing social need. "102 Two factors the ECHR will con-
sider when assessing proportionality are the nature and severity of the 
interference.l03 Both the Spanish government's act of permanent dis-
solution and Judge Garzon's temporary suspension allow Batasuna's 
seven parliamentary members and dozens of local councilors to serve 
out their terms in elected office.104 The Law of Political Parties does 
not impose criminal penalties on pre-ban members nor does it pre-
clude them from future political activity; however, such members may 
not participate in the following year's elections under the banner of 
Batasuna or any party that replaces it in an effort to get around the 
law. 105 Mter dissolving the Welfare Party, Turkey temporarily banned 
96 See id. 
97 See Yazar, Karatas, Askoy & People's Labour Party v. Turkey, App. Nos. 22723-25/93, 
36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6, 77 (2003) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); United Communist Party v. Turkey, App. 
No. 19392/92,26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 154 (1998) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
98 See id. 
99 See Welfare Party v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340, 42-44/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 89 
(2002) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
100 See id.; Purcell v. Ireland, App. No. 15404/89, 1991 YB. Eur. Com. on H.R. 90, 100. 
(Eur. Comm'n on H.R). 
101 See Welfare Party, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 89. 
102 !d. at 91. 
103 !d. 
1°4 See Law of Political Parties, supra note 19, art. 12. 
105 See id. 
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five of its members from any official political activity for their egre-
gious conduct, which the ECHR deemed proportionate to the "press-
ing social need."1°6 Since Spain's interference is less severe than Tur-
key's, its dissolution of Batasuna without individual penalties for its 
members would likewise not violate Article 11.107 
Some international commentators have criticized Spain's total 
and permanent dissolution as too extreme and have suggested that 
provisions holding individuals personally liable for injuries resulting 
from public demonstrations and/ or denying Batasuna public-
financed political party funds would have been more appropriate.l08 
In addition, some point out-as the People's LabouT PaTty court did-
that violence will intensify in the "political vacuum" left by the party's 
dissolution.109 With the exception of Turkey, other Western European 
countries generally have not resorted to the dissolution of political 
parties out of fear of escalating violence.110 In PuTcell, the Commission 
noted that Sinn Fein could have been outlawed under Irish law; how-
ever, the decision not to dissolve the party was "a matter of policy 
which is alone for the Irish Government to determine. "111 The fact 
that more countries have not dissolved parties linked to violence 
might represent policy decisions having little to do with the legality of 
such a measure.l12 The WelfaTe Party court cited a state's narrow mar-
gin of appreciation to "reasonably forestall" the dissolution of a politi-
cal party before implementing it and creating additional risks to civil 
peace.113 Therefore, just because Spain did not ban Batasuna earlier, 
that decision does not preclude its ability to do so now.114 Dissolution 
represents Spain's latest strategy in its long and difficult history of 
dealing with separatist violence.m Such policy decisions will most 
likely fall within the narrow margin of appreciation given to national 
authorities.116 The ECHR may invoke the margin of appreciation as it 
106 See Welfare Party, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91. 
107 See id. 
108 Batasttna Banned, supra note 13. 
109 Emvpe Wmy of Banning Parties, BBC NEWS, Aug. 28, 2002 at http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/low/ europe/2217919.stm [hereinafter Europe Wary]. 
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114 See id. 
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did in Welfare Party to decide in favor of Spain in this close case involv-
ing the difficult question of party dissolution.117 
CoNcLUSION 
The ECHR will most likely find that Spain's dissolution of Bata-
suna does not violate Article 11 of the Convention because the measure 
is "necessary in a democratic society" given the primary importance of 
fighting terrorism. Moreover, there is relevant and sufficient evidence 
showing Batasuna's support of political violence and links to ETA, and 
the ban is proportional to Spain's pressing social need of protecting its 
democratic system and citizens from terrorist violence. 
117 See id. 
